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Abstract
Recently, it has become increasingly important for computer security researchers and incident in-
vestigators to have access to larger and more diverse data sets. At the same time, trends towards
protecting customer privacy have grown as a result of many embarrassing releases—of supposedly anony-
mous information—which has been traced back to individual computer users [7, 15]. This has further
increased reluctance of data owners to release large data sets to the research community or to share logs
relevant to attacks from a common threat. The burgeoning field of data sanitization has helped alleviate
some of these problems as it has recently provided many new tools for anonymizing sensitive data, but
there is still a difficult trade-off to be negotiated between the data owner’s need for privacy and security
and the analyst’s need for high utility data. Data sanitization policies must be created that are secure
enough for the first party, but do not result in too much information loss to be usable to the second.
Necessary to solving this problem of negotiating policies for data sanitization is the ability to analyze
the effects of anonymization on both the security of the sanitized data and the utility left after anony-
mization. In this paper, we focus on analyzing the utility of network traces post-anonymization. Of
course, any such measure of utility will naturally be subjective to the type of analysis being performed.
So this work scopes the problem to utility for the task of attack detection. We employ a methodology
we developed that analyzes the effect of anonymization on Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and we
provide the first rigorous analysis of single field anonymization on IDS effectiveness. This work will begin
to answer the questions of whether the field affects anonymization more than the algorithm; which fields
have a larger impact on utility; and which anonymization algorithms have a larger impact on utility.
1 Introduction
The ability to safely share log files and network traces has become increasing important to several commu-
nities: networking research, computer security research, incident response, and education [23]. Synthetically
generated data is abundant, but has been highly criticized for many uses [14]. Honeynets can be useful
in generating exercises for students and help meet the needs of educators [1], but very few honeynets have
been setup on a scale to generate some of the large, cross-sectional data sets needed by computer security
researchers [25]. Furthermore, using a honeynet does not necessarily release the owner from all legal respon-
sibility when sharing data [19]. Lastly, nothing but real data will suit the needs of the incident responder
who must share data about specific attacks under investigation of real machines. Therefore, there is a high
demand for methods to share real log files and network traces within several communities.
At the same time as there is an increased need to share these data sets, there is increased reluctance.
First, many data owners recognize the inherent security risks of releasing detailed information that could be
used to map out their own networks, services or sensor locations [3, 4, 8, 10, 16, 17, 26, 28]. Secondly, there
are serious privacy concerns that companies have about releasing customer data, especially in light of recent
incidents where some publicly released data—believed to be anonymous—leaked information about specific
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users [7, 15]. Lastly, recent research has questioned the legality of releasing much of the data as has been
done up until now [19].
The burgeoning field of data sanitization has helped address this tension by providing organizations, who
wish to share their data, with new tools to anonymize computer and network logs [4, 5, 12, 16, 18, 20, 21,
22, 22, 26, 27]. However, little has been done to help users negotiate the difficult trade-off between the data
owner’s need for security and privacy, and the data analyst’s need for high quality data—what is called the
utility vs. security trade-off [20]. As anonymization is an inherently lossy process, and the data analyst wants
information as close to the original as possible, there is always this tension and a need to negotiate policies
that meet the needs of both parties.
Necessary to solving this problem of negotiating policies for data sanitization is the ability to analyze the
effects of anonymization on both the security of the sanitized data and the utility left after anonymization.
In this paper, we focus upon the latter problem of evaluating the effects of anonymization on the utility
of the data sets to be shared. Of course, utility is subjective since it depends upon who is using the data,
or more specifically, for what purpose it is being used. Hence, what is important to a researcher in the
network measurements community may be completely irrelevant to the incident responder. Therefore, we
have scoped this work to evaluating utility for attack detection.
The task of attack detection is an important part of the incident responder’s daily job. When investigating
broad attacks, of which their organization is only a part, they may have to settle for anonymized logs from the
other sites involved. It would be a similar case when using a distributed or collaborative intrusion detection
system that crosses organizational boundaries. Output from the sensors may need to be anonymized. Not
only is attack detection important in these “real world” applications, but it is important to the intrusion
detection research community, as well. This community has often complained that their only good data sets
to test new technologies against are synthetic. However, if they can still do their analysis with anonymized
data, then they are more likely to obtain large, real data sets.
The utility of a data set is not only constrained by the type of analysis being done with it but also
the type of data being shared. We have chosen to look at the effects of anonymization on one of the most
commonly shared and general types of data, the pcap formatted network trace. From this type of data,
many others can be derived (e.g., NetFlows) [2].
To quantitatively measure the ability to identify attacks in anonymized data, we developed what we call
the IDS Utility Metric. This measurement evaluates and compares the false positive and negative rates of a
baseline unanonymized data set with that of an anonymized data set. By doing this, we can automate an ob-
jective process to help us answer several questions: (1) How does anonymization of a particular field affect the
ability to detect an attack, (2) are there unique effects when certain pairs or triplets of fields are anonymized
together, and (3) how does the use of different types of anonymization algorithms affect attack identification?
In this paper, we present the results of anonymizing a portion of the 1999 MIT/Lincoln Labs DARPA data
set—by using the FLAIM [20] anonymization framework—with over 150 separate anonymization policies to
help us answer these questions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the anonymization algorithms used
by FLAIM in our experiments, while section 3 describes the methodology and setup of our experiments.
In section 4, we present our results and analysis. We survey the related work in section 6, and state our
conclusions, as well as scope out future work to be done, in sections 7 and 8.
2 FLAIM: Framework for Log Anonymization and Information
Management
We chose to use FLAIM [20] as our anonymization engine for several reasons. First, we could easily script
its execution for a multitude of tests. Second, it has a very flexible XML policy language that made it
simple to generate hundreds of unique anonymization policies. Third, it can anonymize as many or more
fields in PCAP traces as any other anonymization tool. Lastly, FLAIM has a very rich set of anonymization
algorithms that can be applied to all these fields. With these properties, it was the ideal tool for our
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Figure 1: This diagram illustrates the process by which we compare anonymized logs versus non-anonymized
logs.
experiments.
2.1 Anonymization Algorithms
FLAIM implements a plethora of anonymization algorithms for several data types. The three basic data
types available to most anonymization algorithms are binary, string, and numeric. Additionally, there are
a few special data types like timestamps. Binary data is just treated as a string of bits with no special
structure. Algorithms anonymizing binary data output binary data of the same length. String data are
variable length, terminated by a null character. Anonymization algorithms that take in strings will also
output stings. However, the length may change. Numeric data is interpreted as a number of a given base,
specified in the anonymization policy. This is useful, for example, when working with decimal numbers like
a port number. There, one may want to act on individual digits, rather than bits (e.g., replacing the last 3
digits with 0’s).
Table 10 lists the different anonymization algorithms in FLAIM along with the data types they operate
upon. Further information on these algorithms can be found in [6].
2.2 Anonymization Policies in FLAIM
FLAIM provides an expressive and powerful method for specifying anonymization policies that can be mod-
ified at run time, thus enabling efficient automation. An anonymization policy is an XML file that specifies
the anonymization algorithms that should be applied to the various fields in the log, along with any special
parameters to be passed to those algorithms.
3 Methodology
For all of our experiments, we used a subset of the 1999 DARPA evaluation data set. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Office (DARPA) created an Intrusion Detection Evaluation testbed in 1998 and 1999.
Data was captured from a simulated network that was subjected to various attacks. This data set has
been frequently used in evaluating intrusion detection systems since its creation [11]. Thus, we found it
appropriate to use in evaluating the effects anonymization of data can have on intrusion detection.
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As we mention, we used but a portion of the 1999 data set. Specifically, we used the inside tcpdump data
from Wednesday of the second week of the evaluation. Since FLAIM currently just anonymizes TCP, UDP
and ICMP, we filtered out all other network protocols before running our experiments, whose methodology
is depicted in Figure 1.
The IDS Utility Metric is constructed as follows. First, the unanonymized data set is processed by Snort
to produce the “baseline” set of alerts, using the default Snort rule sets. We consider this the ideal set
of alerts for the data set. Next, we take the same data set, and anonymize it—in our case, with FLAIM.
We then take the anonymized data set, and we run Snort against it with the same rule set as before. The
alerts generated from the unanonymized file are used as a baseline against which the alerts generated by
the anonymized file are compared. The difference between the alerts in the anonymized file, versus the
unanonymized file, is used as a measure of the loss of utility in the log. The larger the difference, the more
information was not available in the logs in order for the IDS to correctly identify an attack. This process
is depicted in Figure 1.
FLAIM schemas specify a set of anonymization algorithms that are appropriate for each field in a pcap log.
These are summarized in Figure 4. In this evaluation, we only consider anonymization policies that transform
single fields. Before we can evaluate the affect of multi-field policies, we must come to an understanding of
single field policies. There are 152 single field policies that can be generated for pcap data (Figure 4 in the
Appendix lists all the fields and anonymization algorithms used for testing). Each anonymization algorithm
also has parameters that affect how it anonymizes the field. We will not go over the parameters in detail,
but instead refer readers to the FLAIM manual [6]. Table 9 in the Appendix summarizes the parameter
settings for the anonymization algorithms.
We iterate the process described above over each of the 152 anonymization policies, comparing the results
pre- and post-anonymization. We describe how we compare these data sets in the next section, while the
section after discuses the actual metric in more detail.
3.1 Comparing Snort Alerts
Alerts generated by Snort are defined by several properties (a full list is included in the appendix as table 8).
Each alert is associated with a specific packet. The relevant alert fields—for our purposes—are listed below:
timestamp : the timestamp from the offending packet.
sig generator : the part of Snort generating alert.
sig id : the Id. number of the signature that was fired.
msg : description of the alert.
proto : the protocol of the offending packet.
src : the source IP address of the offending packet.
srcport : The source port of the offending packet.
dst : the destination IP address of the offending packet.
dstport : the destination port of the offending packet.
id : Packet Id.
To determine whether two alert sets are equal we need a way of determining if two alerts are equal.
Normally this can be done by comparing each field of the alerts. However, in this case the alerts generated
from the anonymized log will cause alerts that are actually equal to appear unequal. To overcome this, we
compare alerts on fields which will not change due to anonymization. This leads to two distinct field sets that
must be used when comparing alerts. They are shown in Table 1. Field Set 1 is used when the timestamp
field has not been anonymized. Field Set 2 is used when the timestamp field has been anonymized.
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Field Set 1 Field Set 2
timestamp sig id
sig id src
id srcport
dst
dstport
id
tcpseq
Table 1: The two field sets that are used to compare alerts.
3.2 Metrics for evaluating utility
The purpose of anonymization is to share logs while hiding sensitive information. Anonymization, while
inherently an information reducing procedure, must be measured in terms of the amount of information that
is lost in the file. However, by anonymizing we can introduce new false patterns into the data. The “best”
anonymization policy should minimize information loss, while not adding any new false patterns to the log.
We can consider the IDS process as a pattern classification process. The data set is input, and the IDS
classifies each packet as malicious or not. The alerts generated from the unanonymized data (which we call
the baseline data) are considered to be the correct analysis of the data set. We then compare the alerts
generated by the anonymized data to the baseline data alert set.
Let the set of alerts generated from the baseline file be called Abaseline and the set of alerts generated
from the anonymized file be called Aanony. In terms of alerts we should compare Aanonyvs. Abaseline. The
best result would be for the anonymized alerts to match, exactly, the alerts generated in the baseline set. Let
us consider the baseline alerts to be the target set. The alerts from the anonymized file will be the generated
set. Then we can define several metrics:
True Positive TP = Aanony ∩ Abaseline| The number of alerts in Aanonythat are also in Abaseline.
False Positive FP = |Aanony − (Aanony ∩ Abaseline)| The number of alerts that were generated by the
anonymized file, but were not in the baseline file.
False Negative FN = |Abaseline− (Aanony ∩Abaseline)| The number of alerts that were not caught by the
anonymized file.
The True Positive rate indicates how much of the information was preserved in the anonymized log. The
False Positive rate indicates how many additional patterns were added to the log through anonymization. The
False Negative rate indicate the amount of information that was removed from the log. A good anonymization
policy should make sure both False Positive and False Negative are low while maximizing the True Positive
rate.
While the false positive rate is an important factor of primary importance is the false negative rate, as it
indicates the loss of information through anonymization. For the remainder of this paper, we use both False
Positive and False Negative rates as a measure of the utility of a log post-anonymization, but focus more on
the false negative rate.
4 Results and Analysis
In this section, we describe the results of our experiments with single field anonymization policies. These
experiments provide a substantive start to answering these questions:
• What affects utility more, the fields that are anonymized or the anonymization algorithm?
• Which fields have a larger impact on the utility of a log?
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• Which anonymization algorithms have a larger impact on the utility of a log?
To answer these questions, we evaluated all 152 pairs of fields and anonymization algorithms. For each
pair, the number of alerts generated by Snort was calculated. The alerts generated for each pair were
compared with the baseline alerts (See Table 2 and Table 3). False Positives/False Negatives were calculated
based on the definitions above, whose detailed results we discuss later.
The unanonymized file produced 81 alerts. The number and types of alerts produced are summarized in
Table 4. There are a total of 81 alerts generated in the baseline file, but only 19 unique types of alerts.
4.1 Fields or Anonymization Algorithms?
It is important to understand which causes a greater impact on utility; the field that is being anonymized
or the anonymization algorithm that is being applied.
To evaluate the effects of anonymizing a field we calculate the marginal of a field. The marginal of a
field is the average number of false positive/false negatives over all anonymization algorithms. Similarly, the
marginal of an anonymization algorithm is the false positive/false negative rate averaged over all fields. The
marginal provides a concise summary of the effect of anonymizing a particular field or using a particular
anonymization algorithm.
Figure 2 shows the false positive and false negative marginals of the fields. The full data for these graphs
is in Table 6. Figure 3 shows the false positive and false negative marginals of the anonymization algorithms.
The full data for these graphs is in Table 5.
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Figure 2: The left hand chart shows the marginal of each field with respect to false positives (i.e, the average
number of false positives for a field, averaged over all anonymization algorithms). The right hand chart
shows the marginal of each field with respect to false negatives.
The fact that the majority of fields have no impact on utility, even when anonymized in numerous ways,
indicates that fields are more important than the anonymization algorithm in determining the utility of an
anonymized log. If it was the other way around, we would expect false positives and false negatives to be
more evenly distributed over all the fields.
Figure 2 indicates that the majority of fields generate no false positives or false negatives. The fields
for which this is true (such as DST MAC) did not affect the utility of the log under any anonymization
algorithm. We can conclude that anonymizing these fields has no impact on the utility of a log, with respect
to the IDS metric.
Consider the false positive rate first. We can see that very few fields generated any false positives. This
indicates that anonymization, usually, does not add new patterns.
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Table 2: Alerts generated for Anonymization-Field pairs. AnonyAlg is the anonymization algorithm used;
Field is the field which it was applied on; NumAlerts is the number of alerts that were generated; Num-
TypesOfAlerts is the number of different types of alerts generated. Table 1 of 2.
AnonyAlg Field NumAlerts
NumTypes
OfAlerts
BinaryBlackMarker SRC MAC 81 19
BytesTruncation SRC MAC 81 19
Annihilation SRC MAC 81 19
MacRandomPermutation SRC MAC 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker DST MAC 81 19
BytesTruncation DST MAC 81 19
Annihilation DST MAC 81 19
MacRandomPermutation DST MAC 81 19
IPv4PrefixPreserving IPV4 SRC IP 1014 5
BinaryBlackMarker IPV4 SRC IP 9 4
Annihilation IPV4 SRC IP 9 4
RandomPermutation IPV4 SRC IP 9 4
NumericTruncation IPV4 SRC IP 9 4
IPv4PrefixPreserving IPV4 DST IP 759 5
BinaryBlackMarker IPV4 DST IP 9 4
Annihilation IPV4 DST IP 9 4
RandomPermutation IPV4 DST IP 14 5
NumericTruncation IPV4 DST IP 9 4
BinaryBlackMarker IPV4 ID 81 19
Annihilation IPV4 ID 81 19
NumericTruncation IPV4 ID 81 19
RandomPermutation IPV4 ID 81 19
Classify IPV4 ID 81 19
Annihilation IPV4 OFFSET 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker IPV4 TTL 81 19
Annihilation IPV4 TTL 81 19
NumericTruncation IPV4 TTL 81 19
RandomPermutation IPV4 TTL 81 19
Classify IPV4 TTL 81 19
Annihilation IPV4 CHECKSUM 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker TCP DST PORT 520290 2
NumericTruncation TCP DST PORT 457410 6
Substitution TCP DST PORT 923033 2
Annihilation TCP DST PORT 923033 2
RandomPermutation TCP DST PORT 18 2
Classify TCP DST PORT 521670 2
BinaryBlackMarker TCP SRC PORT 380527 4
NumericTruncation TCP SRC PORT 294519 6
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Table 3: Alerts generated for Anonymization-Field pairs. AnonyAlg is the anonymization algorithm used;
Field is the field which it was applied on; NumAlerts is the number of alerts that were generated; Num-
TypesOfAlerts is the number of different types of alerts generated. Table 2 of 2
AnonyAlg Field NumAlerts
NumTypes
OfAlerts
Substitution TCP SRC PORT 922171 6
Annihilation TCP SRC PORT 922171 6
RandomPermutation TCP SRC PORT 20 4
Classify TCP SRC PORT 381954 4
BinaryBlackMarker TCP SEQUENCE 81 19
NumericTruncation TCP SEQUENCE 65 15
Annihilation TCP SEQUENCE 65 15
Classify TCP SEQUENCE 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker TCP ACK NO 62 16
NumericTruncation TCP ACK NO 56 14
Annihilation TCP ACK NO 56 14
Classify TCP ACK NO 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker TCP FLAGS 5 3
NumericTruncation TCP FLAGS 5 3
Annihilation TCP FLAGS 5 3
BinaryBlackMarker TCP WINDOW 81 19
NumericTruncation TCP WINDOW 81 19
Annihilation TCP WINDOW 81 19
Classify TCP WINDOW 81 19
Annihilation TCP CHECKSUM 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker TCP URGENT 81 19
NumericTruncation TCP URGENT 81 19
Annihilation TCP URGENT 81 19
Classify TCP URGENT 81 19
Annihilation TCP OPTIONS 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker UDP DST PORT 81 19
NumericTruncation UDP DST PORT 81 19
Substitution UDP DST PORT 81 19
Annihilation UDP DST PORT 81 19
RandomPermutation UDP DST PORT 81 19
Classify UDP DST PORT 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker UDP SRC PORT 81 19
NumericTruncation UDP SRC PORT 81 19
Substitution UDP SRC PORT 81 19
Annihilation UDP SRC PORT 81 19
RandomPermutation UDP SRC PORT 81 19
Classify UDP SRC PORT 81 19
Annihilation UDP CHECKSUM 81 19
RandomTimeShift TS SEC 81 19
TimeUnitAnnihilation TS SEC 81 19
Annihilation TS SEC 81 19
BinaryBlackMarker TS SEC 83 20
TimeEnumeration TS SEC 399 19
Annihilation TS USEC 81 19
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Table 4: Alerts generated in the baseline unanonymized file. AlertID is the id of the alert; Num is the
number of that type of alert generated; Desc is a description of the alert
AlertID Num Desc
1 1 (portscan) TCP Portscan 1
323 1 FINGER root query
330 1 FINGER redirection attempt
332 1 FINGER 0 query
356 1 FTP passwd retrieval attempt
359 1 FTP satan scan
503 4 MISC Source Port 20 to ¡1024
1200 9 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL
1201 12 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden
1288 4 WEB-FRONTPAGE / vti bin/ access
1292 30 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing
1418 2 SNMP request tcp
1420 2 SNMP trap tcp
1421 1 SNMP AgentX/tcp request
2467 1 NETBIOS SMB D$ unicode share access
2470 1 NETBIOS SMB C$ unicode share access
2473 1 NETBIOS SMB ADMIN$ unicode share access
3151 6 FINGER / execution attempt
3441 2 FTP PORT bounce attempt
Anony. Alg. vs. Avg. False Positive Rate
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Figure 3: The left hand chart shows the marginal of all the anonymization algorithms, with respect to false
positives. The right hand chart shows the marginal of all anonymization algorithms with respect to false
negatives.
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4.2 Which fields have higher impact on utility?
As Figure 2 and Table 6 clearly show, the majority of fields do not generate false positives. The fields that
do are TCP DST PORT, TCP SRC PORT, IPV4 SRC IP, IPV4 DST IP, TS SEC, and TCP ACK NO.
We can see that several of the fields resulted in an average of 81 alerts. These fields (shown in italics in
the table) had 0 error. Judging from these results, we can see that this set of fields did not affect the utility
of the log as measured by the IDS metric.
TCP DST PORT and TCP SRC PORT generated the most false alerts on average. Upon inspection of
the generated alert files, we can see that most of the pairs generated only 2 types of alerts. In the case of
BinaryBlackMarker there were 520286 alerts of type 524. Alert 524 is “BAD-TRAFFIC tcp port 0 traffic”.
The other anonymization algorithms produced the same pattern—the majority of alerts were of type 524.
The reason for this is the value we substitute for the port field. The BinaryBlackMarker, Substitution,
NumericTruncation, and Annihilation algorithms all replaced the port field with 0. This resulted in the
alert being triggered for nearly all the packets in the log (See Table 9 for the parameter settings of the
anonymization algorithms). The same problem occurs for the TCP SRC PORT field.
The RandomPermutation algorithm replaced the port number with another, random port number, thus
infrequently causing the generation of the BAD-TRAFFIC alert. It is clear from this that the false positive
rate was greatly affected by the choice of the substitution port. However, the effect would have been less
pronounced had we counted the types of new alerts rather than the raw alerts, themselves.
Arguably, it is the false negative count that is most important in determining the utility of a log. A
low false negative count indicates that little information was lost in the process of anonymization. In
terms of false negatives, we find that there are 8 fields that have an impact on the average false nega-
tive rate: TCP DST PORT,TCP FLAGS,TCP SRC PORT, IPV4 DST IP, IPV4 SRC IP,TCP ACK NO,
TCP SEQUENCE, and TS SEC.
4.3 What anonymization algorithms have higher impact on utility?
Figure 3 summarizes the false positive and false negative rates with respect to anonymization algorithm. For
each anonymization algorithm, the average false positive/false negative rate is calculated over all the fields.
Table 5 contains the data for the graphs.
We can see from these that most anonymization algorithms have an impact on the utility of a log. In
contrast, the field data that we saw before showed strong structure in what fields affected utility. When
viewed from the perspective of anonymization algorithms, there is no single anonymization algorithm that
stands out.
We can see from these that most anonymization algorithms have an impact on the utility of a log. In
contrast, the field data that we saw before showed strong structure in what fields affected utility. When
viewed from the perspective of anonymization algorithms, there is no single anonymization algorithm that
stands out.
It might seem like the substitution algorithm has the largest effect with a huge number of alerts. However,
this is because of the parameter setting used. By looking at the false negative rate we can see that while
substitution still has a large effect on utility, most of the other algorithms have an effect as well.
5 Multi-Field Policy Analysis
By multi-field anonymization policies, we are referring to anonymization schemes that transform two or more
fields in a log. The bulk of this work has focused on single field policy analysis. However, single field policy
analysis will lay the groundwork for understanding more complex multi-field policies.
Multi-field policies are difficult to analyze because the fields are often related in subtle ways, not just very
direct ways, such as between the ACK and SEQ numbers. The anonymization of additional fields certainly
does not affect the total number of false positive alerts in a linear way. For example, examine Table 7.
Here, we see that anonymizing 3 fields separately produces 1014, 7 and 399 false alerts, respectively. If
we anonymize the first 2 fields, we get 1016 6= 1014 + 7 alerts. This may not be too surprising. However, if
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Table 5: False negative/positive counts for an anonymization algorithm, aggregated over all log fields.
Anonymization Alg. False Negatives False Positive
Annihilation 10.62 47312.69
BinaryBlackMarker 13.43 30027.37
BytesTruncation 0 0
Classify 8.5 50200.83
IPv4PrefixPreserving 28.8 351
MacRandomPermutation 0 0
NumericTruncation 17.96 32692.13
RandomPermutation 16.72 2.11
RandomTimeShift 0 0
Substitution 38 461298.5
TimeEnumeration 1.25 80.75
TimeUnitAnnihilation 0 0
Table 6: False negative/positive counts for a field, aggregated over all anonymization algorithms
Field False Negatives False Positive
DST MAC 0 0
IPV4 CHECKSUM 0 0
IPV4 DST IP 72 151
IPV4 ID 0 0
IPV4 OFFSET 0 0
IPV4 SRC IP 72 201
IPV4 TTL 0 0
SRC MAC 0 0
TCP ACK NO 20 2.75
TCP CHECKSUM 0 0
TCP DST PORT 77.67 557572.33
TCP FLAGS 76 0
TCP OPTIONS 0 0
TCP SEQUENCE 8 0
TCP SRC PORT 75.5 483554.83
TCP URGENT 0 0
TCP WINDOW 0 0
TS SEC 1.2 65.2
TS USEC 0 0
UDP CHECKSUM 0 0
UDP DST PORT 0 0
UDP SRC PORT 0 0
Table 7: This table shows that a multi-field policy has uncertain affects on the utility of a log
Policy Alerts
IPV4 SRC IP-IPv4PrefixPreserving 1014
TCP SRC PORT-RandomPermutation 7
TS SEC-TimeEnumeration 399
IPV4 SRC IP,TCP SRC PORT 1016
IPV4 SRC IP,TCP SRC PORT and TS SEC 1010
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we do all 3 fields together, we get only 1010 alerts—rather than something around 1420 = 1014 + 7 + 399.
This is actually fewer false alerts than any one field being anonymized in isolation.
So while there is always more information loss when anonymizing more fields, there may be a critical
point at which one starts getting fewer false positives as they do additional anonymization. We suspect
that this is always the case since complete anonymization will leave nothing to alert upon. But clearly,
more analysis must be done on multi-field anonymization, and our future work will be focused on evaluating
multi-field anonymization policies.
6 Related Work
Work in data sanitization for computer and network logs to date has focused almost entirely upon devel-
opment of tools [20, 9, 27, 13, 5, 17] and anonymization algorithms [26], with little to no work doing any
formal analysis of the effects of anonymization. This is an important aspect missing from the research body
since without it, we just have a lot of tools to haphazardly anonymize data without knowing how to do it
wisely or effectively. This is also in stark contrast to k-anonymity [24] which is usually applied to medical
and census type data and has received much more attention from the research community.
While writing this paper, a new piece of work closely related to ours appeared [27]. Though this is mostly
a paper presenting yet another anonymization tool for pcap logs, at the end they introduce a similar method
of analyzing the effects of anonymization of pcap traces by use of an IDS. Theirs is a cursory analysis, only
considering anonymization of one field at a time and for only a few different fields. Also, their analysis
only considered the number of alerts, where the more alerts are generated the more “security analysis” is
provided. Clearly, more than just the number of alerts needs to be considered when evaluating utility, such
as the false positive and negative rates. We were unable to reproduce their results (which may be because
they used an unspecified subset of the LBNL data set2), but more troubling is the use of this data set in the
first place. To evaluate the effects of anonymization, one must start with unanonymized data. However, this
LBNL data set is already anonymized. So one has no clean baseline with which to compare the anonymized
data in this case.
7 Conclusions
Anonymization can be a powerful tool to allow greater cooperation between organizations. The need for
cooperation is strikingly clear. However, a clear understanding of the needs of the data provider and the
client is necessary before flexible, effective sharing between organizations can occur.
The objective of this paper has been to begin to formally evaluate the utility vs. security trade off. The
IDS metric is simple yet effective in evaluating the difference in utility when anonymizing different fields in
different ways.
In this paper, we have focused on answering three questions: whether the field affects anonymization
more than the algorithm; which fields have a larger impact on utility; and which anonymization algorithms
have a larger impact on utility.
We have provided a thorough evaluation of single field anonymization polices upon pcap formatted
network traces. We found that the primary impact on the utility of a log is not the particular anonymization
algorithm, but rather the field that was anonymized.
In addition, we were able to empirically show a range of utilities for a log based on the field that was
anonymized. The loss of utility was largest for ports and IP addresses. There was some loss of utility for the
fields of ID, sequence number, flags, timestamp, and ACK number. However, for many of the fields there
was no change in utility when anonymized.
This empirical evaluation provides the basis for further work on studying the impact of more complex
anonymization schemes on the utility of a log.
2http://www.icir.org/enterprise-tracing/
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8 Future Work
There are numerous ways in which this work can be extended. First of all, it is clear that evaluating utility
via Snort generated IDS alerts will cause the utility to depend upon the rule set. In fact, it is as of yet
unclear exactly how the rule set impacts the utility measure. Though, we suspect there is a significant effect
since we found the specific fields anonymized has more effect than how it was anonymized, and Snort rules
usually focus on a one or two fields.
While we used Snort for all of our experiments, it is just one IDS and only one type. It would be very
interesting to investigate whether anomaly-based IDSs are affected in similar ways.
The strength of an anonymization algorithm is a measure of how difficult it is to “break” or “de-
anonymize” a log that has been anonymized via the algorithm. It is clear that we want strong anonymization
algorithms so that attackers will have a difficult time to break the algorithm. As [20] points out, there is
a trade off between the security of an anonymization algorithm and the utility of the log. We have not
discussed the strength of an anonymization algorithm in this work.
Our work is currently limited to anonymization policies for just one field. Our next step would be to
extend this work to multiple field anonymization policies and to work with more realistic data. The DARPA
evaluation data set is useful because it is supervised, however it is still synthetic. In the future, we will be
gaining access to other large unanonymized data sets that we can use instead of the DARPA data. However,
it is important for this research to have unanonymized baseline sets.
Finally, we have still focused on utility for just one task, attack detection. An incident responder does
more than just detect attacks, and in the future, we could look at how anonymizing logs affects other
important security related tasks—such as alert correlation.
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9 Appendix
Table 8: Fields in a SNORT alert.
• timestamp
• sig generator
• sig id
• sig rev
• msg
• proto
• src
• srcport
• dst
• dstport
• ethsrc
• ethdst
• ethlen
• tcpflags
• tcpseq
• tcpack
• tcplen
• tcpwindow
• ttl
• tos
• id
• dgmlen
• iplen
• icmptype
• icmpcoe
• icmpid
• icmpseq
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SRC_MAC
DST_MAC
TCP_FLAGS
TCP_SEQUENCE
TCP_ACK_NO
TCP_WINDOWS
TCP_URGENT
TCP_DST_PORT
TCP_SRC_PORT
UDP_DST_PORT
UDP_SRC_PORT
ICMP_GATEWAY
ICMP_ORIG_DATA
IPV4_LENGTH
TCP_OFFSET
UDP_LENGTH
ICMP_IPV4_LENGTH
IPV4_ID
IPV4_TTL
ICMP_TYPE
ICMP_CODE
ICMP_IDENTIFIER
ICMP_SEQUENCE
ICMP_POINTER
ICMP_IPV4_ID
ICMP_IPV4_TTL
ICMP_TS_ORIG
ICMP_TS_REC
ICMP_TS_TRANS
TS_SEC
IPV4_OFFSET
IPV4_CHECKSUM
TCP_CHECKSUM
TCP_OPTIONS
UDP_CHECKSUM
ICMP_CHECKSUM
ICMP_IPV4_OFFSET
ICMP_IPV4_CHECKSUM
TS_USEC
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
IPv4PrefixPreserving
RandomPermutation
NumericTruncation
MacRandomPermutation
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
BytesTruncation
RandomPermutation
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
NumericTruncation
Classify
Fields Anonymization
IPV4_DST_IP
ICMP_IPV4_SRC_IP
ICMP_IPV4_DST_IP
IPV4_SRC_IP
NONE
Annihilation
Classify
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
Substitution
RandomPermutation
NumericTruncation
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
NumericTruncation
Classify
Fields Anonymization
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
NumericTruncation
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
IPv4PrefixPreserving
RandomPermutation
NumericTruncation
Classify
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
BinaryBlackMarker
Annihilation
RandomTimeShift
TimeUnitAnnihilation
TimeEnumeration
Fields Anonymization
Figure 4: PCAP Fields and Anonymization Algorithms. Each section contains the fields (on the left) on
which any of the anonymization algorithms on the right can be applied. For instance, Only the anonymization
algorithms BinaryBlackMarker and Annihilation can be applied to the ICMP ORIG DATA field (the bottom
left section)
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Table 9: Parameters to the Anonymization Algorithms
Anonymization Algorithm Parameters Description
IPV4PrefixPreserving Passphrase: foobar Sets the anonymization
passphrase.
MacRandomPermutation None No Parameters.
RandomTimeShift lowerTimeShiftLimit: 16250000
upperTimeShiftLimit: 31500000
Shift time by a random amount
between the lower and upper lim-
its.
TimeUnitAnnihilation timeField: years Annihilate the years portion of
the timestamp.
NumericTruncation numShift: 5
radix: 2
Shorten the field by 5 bits.
TimeEnumeration baseTime: 0
intervalSize: 1
Set the time of the oldest record
to 0. One timestp is equal to
adding 1 to the timestamp field.
RandomPermutation None No Parameters.
Annihilation None No Parameters.
Classify configString: 1024:0,65536:65535 Set elements less than 1024 to 0,
and all others to 65535.
BinaryBlackMarker numMarks: 8
replacement: 0
Mark 8 bits as 0
BytesTruncation numbits: 20
direction: left
Remove 20 bits, starting from the
left.
Substitution substitute: 0 Substitute field with 0.
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Table 10: Anonymization algorithms with applicable data types.
Anonymization Alg. Data Type(s) Description
Prefix-preserving binary Implements prefix-preserving permuta-
tion described in [26]
Truncation binary Removes suffix or prefix of data by
string specified number of units.
numeric
Hash binary Outputs cryptographic has of data.
string
hostname
Black Marker binary Overwrites specified number of units
string with specified constant.
hostname
Time Unit Annihilation timestamp Annihilates particular time units
(e.g., hour and minute units).
Random Time Shift timestamp Randomly shifts timestamps within
given window by same amount.
Enumeration timestamp Preserves order, but not distance
between elements.
Random Permutation binary Creates random 1-to-1 mapping.
Annihilation binary Replaces field with NULL value.
string
Classify numeric Partitions data into multiple non-
overlapping subsets.
Substitution binary Replaces all instances with a particu-
numeric lar constant value.
18
